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A B S T R A C T
The tone of a firm's financial disclosure is increasingly used as a variable in panel data regressions to predict
future performance and explain investors' reaction at earnings announcement. We investigate when tone is
informative, and argue that the informativeness of tone increases with the information asymmetry between firms
and investors. Using a sample of over 50,000 earnings press releases of about 1800 U.S. public firms between
2004 and 2015, we find that firm growth, size, age, complexity and forecast inaccuracy are key drivers of tone
informativeness. The effect is economically significant, since, compared to the reference case of a transparent
firm, we find that the slope coefficient of tone doubles or even quadruples in panel data regressions when the
firm operates in an environment with high information asymmetry.
1. Introduction
Earnings press releases are an important voluntary communication
channel for firms to reduce the information asymmetry between man-
agers and stakeholders in a timely manner. In fact, several studies show
that the tone of earnings press releases (i.e., the difference between the
number of positive and negative words) is a reliable signal of future
earnings (Miller & Piotroski, 2002), and that the market positively re-
acts to the tone over the short and long term (Arslan-Ayaydin, Boudt, &
Thewissen, 2016; Henry, 2008). Whereas much of prior research tests
the presence of predictive and explanatory power of tone, the primary
focus of this paper is to examine the relationship between information
asymmetry and its informativeness.
This paper is key to increase our understanding of the role that fi-
nancial narratives play in investors' assessments of firm performance,
and to what extent qualitative information contains incremental in-
formation to that of quantitative data. This topic has become increas-
ingly important for investors, regulators and other stakeholders as there
is growing scepticism on the usefulness of financial narratives. For in-
stance, in 2013, the Chairman of the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB), Hans Hoogervorst, expressed his fear that fi-
nancial narratives may become compliance documents, rather than a
means of conveying useful information (Reuters, 2013). Additionally,
Loughran and McDonald (2017) study the server log of the SEC and
show that firm disclosures are only limitedly requested by investors,
questioning the importance investors attach to first-hand qualitative
data. As such, our analysis is central in ascertaining whether the tone of
financial narratives is relevant to the market.
We contribute to the literature by investigating the effect of in-
formation asymmetry on the informativeness of tone in predicting fu-
ture firm performance and explaining the investors' reaction. We test
this by using a sample of 53,000 earnings press releases by 1,829
published U.S. firms, written within the period 2004–2015. Consistent
with the literature, we find that, on average, the tone of press releases
contains information to predict future return-on-assets and explain
cumulative abnormal returns at earnings announcement. However, the
significance of this relationship is not systematic. In fact, we find that
the tone of earnings press releases contains significant explanatory
power for about 25% of the firms in our sample at a traditional level of
10%. This result points out the presence of differences in informative-
ness of tone across firms.
Next, we unravel to what extent information asymmetry affects
these differences. We hypothesize and find that, when a firm is smaller,
younger and in a higher growth stage, tone is more informative.
Furthermore, we provide evidence that tone informativeness also in-
creases in case of higher analysts' forecast inaccuracy and activity in
multiple segments, both geographically or cross-business. Qualitative
information in firms' disclosures is thus differentially informative to the
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market, and its information value is a positive function of the level of
information asymmetry between managers and investors.
The strong cross-sectional differences in tone informativeness imply
that the slope coefficient of tone, obtained through traditional panel
data regressions, needs to be interpreted with caution. We therefore
extend the traditional explanatory and predictive panel data approach,
by adding interaction terms between tone and the several hypothesized
proxies for information asymmetry. Our results indicate that, compared
to the reference case of a transparent and established firm, the pre-
diction accuracy of tone towards future performance and the investor
reaction substantially increases in size as the degree of information
asymmetry is higher.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on
disclosure tone and information asymmetry, and develops the hy-
potheses. Section 3 introduces the general methodological approach to
indicate heterogeneity, whereas Section 4 entails the data collection
and variable description. Section 5 reports our main findings, whereas
in Section 6, we adjust traditional panel data regression and study how
tone informativeness changes with increasing information asymmetry.
Section 7 concludes.
2. The heterogeneity of tone informativeness and its determinants
There exists strong evidence that the market uses qualitative in-
formation from earnings press releases to infer inside information of
managers. In practice, tone is a proxy for the information content of any
financial narrative, and is used in a broad field of research as an in-
dependent variable in panel data regressions and predictive perfor-
mance models (Davis, Piger, & Sedor, 2012; Davis & Tama-Sweet, 2012;
Engelberg, 2008; Henry, 2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2011). For in-
stance, Davis et al. (2012) document the positive correlation between
the tone of earnings press releases and the firm's future performance.
Based on this result, they evidence the immediate positive effect of tone
on the three-day cumulative abnormal returns around earnings an-
nouncement. Henry (2008), Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2016) and Price,
Doran, Peterson, and Bliss (2012) also report that the tone of earnings
press releases is significantly positively correlated with short window
contemporaneous returns around the date that the disclosures are
made, even after controlling for a firm's financial information and
earnings surprises.
The aforementioned studies measure tone as the relative difference
between the number of positive and negative words, and is included in
panel data models as follows:
= + ⋅ + ⋅ +Y α δ Tone β X ε ,i q t i q t i q t i q t, , , , , , , , (1)
where Y i,q,t is the dependent variable for firm i in quarter q of year t.
Xi,q,t represents the information set for firm i available at the time of the
earnings press release, and Tonei,q,t is the tone of the earnings press
release. As such, we can infer the information value of tone with respect








.i q t i q t
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, , (2)
Panel data regressions, such as Eq. (1), obtain a single δ for the
whole sample. This average effect can be considered a bad advisor of
the information value of tone for firms that are opaque, compared to the
average firm.
It is common knowledge that firm stakeholders tend to attach more
value to actively gathering information when there is a higher in-
formation asymmetry. In fact, Hartmann-Wendels (1987) and Veronesi
(1999) find that investors, operating in an uncertain environment, at-
tach more value to new information that becomes available. Neilson
(2016) shows that, when the difficulty of interpreting changes in
earnings increases, investors attempt to gather more information at the
firm-level. This points out that the investors' value towards news
increases with firm-level opaqueness. Furthermore, using dividend an-
nouncements as events, Jung (2007) reports that investors react more
strongly to the announcements when information asymmetry is higher.
In a similar vein, Demers and Vega (2010) show that firms display
strong differences in their reported textual content, and document that
this is also reflected in the market reaction to the soft information in the
earnings press release. In particular, they find that the market responds
more to soft information for high-tech firms, for high price-earning
ratios and R&D firms, as well as for firms with a low accounting quality.
Finally, Diamond (1985) and Hakansson (1977) evidence that higher
transparency at the firm-level lowers the benefits of highly informed
investors to actively gather information, and increases the benefits for
less informed investors. Overall, their research suggests that the mar-
ginal value of information is higher when greater information asym-
metry is at play.
If the sensitivity of the investors' response to information is a posi-
tive function of the level of information asymmetry, we argue that tone
informativeness should differ across firms as a function of information
asymmetry. Simply put, we conjecture that investors and other stake-
holders allocate more value to the qualitative content provided in the
press releases of an opaque and risky firm, than that of a transparent
and low-risk firm. Our first hypothesis therefore aims to test for cross-
sectional differences of tone informativeness and to what extent the
tone of firms' financial narratives has explanatory power to predict
future firm performance and explain investors' reaction:
H1a. The tone informativeness of earnings press releases to predict future
operational performance is heterogeneous across firms.
H1b. The tone informativeness of earnings press releases to explain
investors' reaction at earnings announcement is heterogeneous across firms.
Our following hypotheses test whether information asymmetry
drives the information value of tone. We proxy for information asym-
metry with a set of commonly used variables from prior literature, more
specifically; firm size, age, growth, forecast inaccuracy and operational
complexity. We describe each variable below in more detail.
2.1. Size, age and growth
The inverse relationship between information asymmetry and firm
size has been well documented (Fama & Schwert, 1977; Ross, 1977;
Vermaelen, 1981). Younger firms generally have higher information
asymmetry than their elder counterpart, have lower analyst coverage
and are thus more risky for investors. Baeyens and Manigaart (2003)
report that information asymmetry decreases over the lifetime of a firm
and Berger and Udell (1998) show that firms in different life cycle
stages have strong differences in funding possibilities. Mature firms are
more reliable since they are covered more by analysts, and thus have
greater ability to raise funds from the market. Smith and Watts (1992)
also argue that the degree of information asymmetry is larger for firms
with significant growth opportunities. If firm size, age and growth stage
are important drivers of information asymmetry, we expect that the
incremental information contained in earnings press releases of such
opaque firms, are of greater value to investors. We thus pose that the
impact of qualitative information is higher for smaller, younger growth
firms.
H2a. Ceteris paribus, the smaller, younger and more growth-oriented the
firm is, the higher the signaling power of tone in predicting future
performance.
H2b. Ceteris paribus, the smaller, younger and more growth-oriented the
firm is, the higher the marginal sensitivity of investors' reaction towards tone.
2.2. Forecast error
Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin (1981), Atiase and Bamber (1994) and
Christie (1981) show that analysts' forecast accuracy is a strong proxy
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for information asymmetry and find that firms with higher levels of
information asymmetry regarding the firm's cash flows tend to have
larger forecast errors. Kimbrough (2005) finds that additional in-
formation surrounding forecasts, obtained from conference calls, re-
duces forecast underreactions and the strength of market reactions. We
similarly expect that the additional information contained within
earnings press releases is more informative in cases of higher earnings'
uncertainty.
H3a. Ceteris paribus, the more inaccurate the analysts' forecast error of a
firm's earnings, the more positive the signaling power of tone in predicting
future performance.
H3b. Ceteris paribus, the more inaccurate the analysts' forecast error of a
firm's earnings, the more positive the marginal sensitivity of investors'
reaction to tone.
2.3. Operational complexity
In the final hypothesis, we posit that the operational complexity
dims the market's view on earnings, resulting in reduced transparency.
Barinov, Park, and Yildizhan (2016) find that the post-earnings an-
nouncement drift is stronger for firms with a more complex operational
structure. In addition, they show that the sensitivity of earnings an-
nouncement returns to the earnings surprise is significantly stronger for
complex firms, indicating higher market reaction to earnings surprises.
Firms, active in multiple business segments and geographical segments,
are more demanding towards the corporate level and are therefore
more vulnerable towards inefficiencies (Bushman, Qi, Engel, & Smith,
2004). Jennings, Seo, and Tanlu (2014) find that geographical di-
versification decreases the quality of management forecasts, because
increasing firm complexity obscures the ability to gather and process
data. In addition, Gilson, Healy, Noe, and Palepu (2001) show that
increasing operational complexity leads to an increase in asymmetry of
information between firm insiders and outside investors. In line with
their findings, we believe that higher operational complexity dims both
the management's as well as the market's assessment of future earnings.
Consequently, these firms have higher levels of information asymmetry
and we thus expect the market to attach more value to the tone of these
firm's earnings press releases. We pose that:
H4a. Ceteris paribus, the operational complexity of a firm is positively
associated with the signaling power of tone in predicting future performance.
H4b. Ceteris paribus, the operational complexity of a firm is positively
associated with the marginal sensitivity of the investors' reaction towards
tone.
3. A two-step approach to analyse heterogeneity of tone
informativeness
In this section we develop a two-step framework that reveals the
presence of differences in tone informativeness across firms, and en-
covers its drivers. This methodology is inspired by the two-step ap-
proach of Fama and MacBeth (1973), extensively used within the lit-
erature of asset pricing (see, e.g., Goyal, 2012; Jagannathan,
Schaumburg, & Zhou, 2010; Roll, 1977).
3.1. Estimating tone informativeness and its determinants
Tone proxies for the information content in any qualitative narra-
tive. As shown in Eq. (1), tone is generally used as an independent
variable in panel data regression and predictive performance models
(see, e.g., Davis et al., 2012; Davis & Tama-Sweet, 2012; Henry, 2008;
Loughran & McDonald, 2011). In order to obtain each firm's value of
tone informativeness, δi, rather than performing one singular panel data
regression, we run the following ordinary least squares estimation for
the N firms in our dataset separately:
= + ⋅ + ⋅ +Y α δ Tone β X ε ,i q t i i i q t i i q t i q t, , , , , , , , (3)
where Yi,q,t represents future performance or investors' reaction at
quarter q of year t. In Appendix A we show that the investors' reaction
to tone can be rational under a dividend discount model. Note that
contrary to the panel data model in Eq. (1), the tone informativeness
parameter in Eq. (3) is firm-specific, as indicated by the subscript i.










i q t i q t
i q t
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, , (4)
Performing separate firm regressions allows us to obtain a measure
of each firm's sensitivity to tone, both in predicting future performance
and explaining the investors' reaction. The newly obtained sample of
firm-specific informativeness measures, enables us to study its hetero-
geneity and identify its drivers.
3.2. Step 1 – testing the homogeneity assumption of the firms' δ
To verify whether tone informativeness is different across firms, we
start by testing for its homogeneity. More specifically, we look at the
tone informativeness parameter defined in Eq. (4) for all N firms se-
parately and question whether:
= = = …=H δ δ δ δ: .N0 1 2 3 (5)
The firm-by-firm regressions proposed in Eq. (3), are a direct way to
obtain unbiased estimates of each firm's sensitivity to tone (or tone
informativeness): δi. The obtained sample of N estimated firm-specific
δi s serves as the sample statistic to test the hypothesis of homogeneity
in Eq. (5). We derive the distribution of the test statistic under the
Gauss-Markov assumption that the homoscedastic and serially un-
correlated regression error term has mean zero, and is independent of
the regressors. We then have that each firm's ̂δi is (asymptotically)
normally distributed around the actual (true) δi. Given that SEδi is a








N (0, 1),i i
δi (6)
for T → ∞. The unknown in this equation is δi. Under H0 of homo-
geneity and following the law of large numbers, we have that the cross-










for N → ∞. Asymptotically, when the number of firms N and the
number of time series observations T becomes infinitely large, we have
that the standardized estimated δ follows a standard normal distribu-










Typically, we’ll have that T/N → 0, since the number of firms in our
sample, N, is much larger than the amount of time-points, T. In the
empirical analysis, we obtain the estimated standard error, SEδi , by
using the Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation con-
sistent standard errors (HAC). H0 (see, Eq. (5)) can then simply be
verified by a test of normality. Rejecting the normality provides evi-
dence against the null of equality of the firm's δi and indicates the ex-
istence of substantial differences across firm's tone informativeness.
In Appendix B, we conduct a simulation analysis to document the
statistical validity of the proposed test for heterogeneity.1 We show that
1 We thank the reviewer for this suggestion.
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this method correctly rejects normality in cases of a heterogeneous δ
with increasing N and T, under the similar dimensions as our data
sample. We refer the reader to the Appendix for more details.
3.3. Step 2 – analysing the determinants of the cross-sectional variation in
δiST
The previous step shows the existence of differences within tone
informativeness across firms, but it does not indicate what drives these
differences. We propose to model the information value of tone, δiST , as
a linear function of relevant independent variables:
= + ⋅ +δ γ γ Z ε ,iST i i i0 (9)
where the error term, εi, is assumed to have zero mean.2
Note however, that in the firm-by-firm regressions of Eq. (3) mul-
tiple time observations for each variable (t=1,…,T) are used to obtain
one firm-specific measure of tone informativeness, δiST . Because we only
have one dependent variable per firm, we need to transform the set of
time varying control variables (Xi,q,t in Eq. (3)) to a cross-sectional set
(Zi in Eq. (9)). Simply put, we average Xi,q,t to obtain Zi. Finding sta-
tistical significance of the estimated regressor coefficients, in the cross-
sectional regression, further confirms the heterogeneity of informa-
tiveness and sheds light on its drivers.
4. Data
4.1. Sample description
Our sample consists out of U.S. data of publicly listed firms for the
period of 2004Q1 up to 2015Q4. We download all possible earnings
press releases available under the 8-K forms which are stored on the
website of the SEC, as proposed by Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
act of 2002. To further ensure data reliability, we do not consider
earnings press releases, written before 2004. The earnings press releases
are freely available and found under exhibit 99.1: “<TYPE>EX
99.1”, or similar.3
In a second stage the downloaded press releases, which are stored as
html-pages and contain the earnings press releases, are re-encoded into
a more readable format. We follow the practice in accordance with the
literature of parsing the text according to the following steps (Arslan-
Ayaydin et al., 2016; Davis et al., 2012; Davis & Tama-Sweet, 2012;
Henry, 2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2011):
i. Remove graphics.
ii. Re-encode characters such as &nbsp (blank space) or &amp (&) back
to their original ASCII form.
iii. Remove all text appearing within<TABLE>HTML tags, where
more than 15% of the non-blank characters are numbers.
We impose a threshold in terms of minimum number of words in the
press releases to ensure that our sample only contains valid press re-
leases and no misfilings. Davis et al. (2012) suggest that the reliability
of the data collection increases if the minimal text length is 100 words,
however we use a minimal length of 200 words as an extra imposed
restriction because of the high amount of available press releases.4 This
leads to a total amount of 157,423 firm-quarter earnings press releases.
We furthermore include data of a financial or accounting nature for
which Compustat, CRSP and I/B/E/S are required. Because of missing
data within the firm-quarter observations, the dataset is reduced to
60,710 observations. In order to ensure a sufficient number of firm-
specific observations needed to capture each firm's tone informative-
ness, we keep firms with at least 15 unique quarter-year observations.
We obtain a final sample of 52,667 earnings press releases from 1829
unique firms, with an average of about 29 observations per firm.5 Out
of these 1829 firms, about 70% (1274 firms) have been part of the S&P
1500 and about 27% (488 firms) have been part of the S&P 500
throughout the period of 2004–2015.
Table 1 presents the share of firms and observations of each industry
in the total sample, alongside the composition of the S&P 1500 and S&P
500 for presentation purposes. The majority of firms within our dataset
are active in manufacturing (about 41%). Financial firms and firms
active in the service industry are also well represented in the sample.
Public administration firms along with agricultural firms are marginally
Table 1
Number of firms and observations per industry.
Sample S&P 1500 S&P 500
SIC Division # Observations % Firms % Firms % Firms
01–09 Agriculture, Forestry,
Fishing
45 0% 0% 0%
10–17 Mining &
Construction
2187 4.5% 5.7% 7.4%
20–39 Manufacturing 22,206 41.1% 39.3% 40%
40–49 Transportation &
Public Utilities
4371 8,5% 9.8% 14.2%
50–59 Wholesale Trade &
Retail Trade
5403 10% 11.3% 9.8%
60–67 Finance, Insurance &
Real Estate
10,380 20% 18.7% 17.4%




122 0.2 % 0% 0%
Total: 52,667
This table displays the number of observations and share of firms per industry using the two-digit SIC-codes. The S&P 1500 and S&P 500 composition is computed at
the beginning of 2010, about midway throughout our sample period.
2 If γi is zero, it nests the special case of equal δ across firms. Zi controls for several firm
characteristics.
3 Not all earnings press releases are filed under the same TYPE. Other similar ab-
breviations are used consistently throughout the filings, such as; “99-1”, “99.01”, etc.
These cases were downloaded as well, and manually verified in terms of containing an
earnings press release.
4 Using a minimum threshold of 100 words does not alter our conclusions.
5 In our robustness tests, this dataset is further reduced to firms for which there are at
least 20 and 25 quarter-year observations. These datasets contain 46,663 and 30,607
observations respectively. Results remain qualitatively similar.
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present (less than 1%).6
4.2. Variables
We next give the definition of future performance and investors'
reaction, tone of earnings press releases, proxies for information
asymmetry and the control variables. Table 2 lists the variables used in
this study.
4.2.1. Future performance and investors' reaction
As presented in Eq. (3), we use firm-by-firm regressions to obtain
estimates of each firm's sensitivity of future firm performance and in-
vestors' reaction to the tone of earnings press releases. To proxy for
future performance, we use the next quarter's return on assets, FU-
TROAi,q,t. The investors' reaction is estimated following prior literature
as the cumulative abnormal returns, or CAR (Arslan-Ayaydin et al.,
2016; Davis et al., 2012; Demers & Vega, 2014). CARi,q,t is computed by
taking the difference between the observed value of the firm's returns
and the expected value computed using a market model. This market
model regresses the firm returns on the market returns to obtain the
ordinary least squares estimate of the intercept (αi,q,t) and the slope
coefficient (βi,q,t). Using data from a window starting 315 days before
the announcement and ending 62 days before the date of the an-
nouncement, the ordinary least squares estimates of αi,q,t and βi,q,t are
obtained, denoted as ̂αi q t, , and βi q t, , . The daily differences in a three-day
window around the announcement date, d*, are then summed, and form
the cumulative abnormal returns:
̂∑− + = − − ⋅
=−
+
+ +CAR R α β R[ 1; 1] ,i q t
j
i d j q t i q t i q t M d j q t, ,
1
1
, * , , , , , , , * , ,
(10)
where +Ri d j q t, * , , represents the firm i’s returns on day d*+ j of quarter q
of year t, and +RM d j q t, * , , represents the market's returns.
4.2.2. Tone
Through a bag-of-words approach, we use predefined libraries of
positive and negative words to construct our measure of tone. This
method simply counts the number of positive and negative words
within any narrative such that an overall degree of positivity is ob-
tained, proxying the information content of the press release (Henry,
2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2011, 2013). Several ways of con-
structing tone came forth from the literature. For example Sadique, In,
and Veeraraghavan (2008) opt for using positive tone and negative
tone, measured by the number of positive and negative words in the
narrative section, as separate measures. Davis et al. (2012) define net
optimism as the difference between the number of positive words and
negative words. In this paper however, we follow Brockman and Cicon
(2013), Demers and Vega (2014) and Arslan-Ayaydin et al. (2016) by
defining the tone as the spread between the number of positive and








i q t i q t
i q t
, ,
, , , ,
, , (11)
where PWi,q,t represents the number of positive words for firm i, in
quarter q of year t, NWi,q,t represents the number of negative words and
TWi,q,t refers to the total number of words in the earnings press release.
There are numerous available word lists to categorize words as
being positive and negative, but using finance related libraries gen-
erally leads to less biased results in the analysis of earnings press re-
leases (Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2016; Loughran & McDonald, 2011). We
therefore limit ourselves to two of the more established dictionaries
developed within this finance literature: the positive and negative
wordlists by Henry (2008) and the ones by Loughran and McDonald
(2011) (see, e.g., Doran, Peterson, & Price, 2010; Ferguson, Philip, Lam,
& Guo, 2014; Huang, Teoh, & Zhang, 2014; Garcia, 2012; Loughran &
McDonald, 2011, 2013). Although both the Henry and Loughran &
McDonald libraries are specifically designed for finance applications,
we further avoid our results to be driven by choice of library and define
an overall measure of sentiment which is the centered average of both




Panel A – Dependent variables
FUTROAi,q,t Next quarter's ROAi for firm i, with respect to quarter q of year t.
CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t The cumulative abnormal returns for firm i within a short term time-window around the announcement date of the press release of quarter q in year t. The
cumulative abnormal returns are acquired using a market model that is estimated over a window of [d-315; d-63].
Panel B – Control variables
Tonei,q,t The overall tone of the earnings press release of firm i of year t, in q; The tone is measured by: =
−
Tone ,i q t
PWi q t NWi q t
TWi q t
, ,
, , , ,
, ,
where TW represents the total amount
of words in the press release. Different libraries are used to define the amount of positive words (PW) and negative words (NW): Loughran & McDonald, Henry
and their centered average.
ROAi,q,t (ROA of firm i in quarter q of year t, before extraordinary items) / (total assets at the quarter start).
RETi,q,t Buy-and-hold returns of firm i of quarter q of year t, for the 12month period, ending three months after the fiscal year end.
σRETi,q,t Standard deviation for firm i of RETi over the last 12months ending three months after the fiscal year-end, t.
σROAi,q,t Standard deviation of ROA over the last 5 years.
MCi,q,t Logarithm of the market capitalization of firm i on the last day of the quarter q of year t (in $ mil), i.e. Pi,d,q,t ⋅ CSHOi,q,t, where Pi,d,q,t represent the price of firm i
on day d of quarter q of year t and CSHOi,q,t is the number of common shares outstanding of firm i at the end of quarter q of year t.
BTMi,q,t log(1+Book-To-Market ratio for firm i in quarter q of year t).
BUSsegi,q,t log(1+# of Business Segments of firm i in quarter q of year t).
GEOsegi,q,t log(1+# of Geographical Segments of firm i in quarter q of year t).
AGEi,t log(1+# years since firm i first appears in CRSP monthly file, relative to time t).
LOSSi,q,t 1 if ROA is negative for firm i in quarter q of year t, 0 otherwise.
Δ(ROAi,q,t) Change in (ROA for firm i in quarter q of year t before extraordinary items) /(beginning total assets).
FEi,q,t (I/B/E/S actual earnings per share (EPS) - median of most recent analysts forecasts) / (stock price at the fiscal year-end, for firm i in quarter q of year t).
MedianConsi,q,t Median of the analyst forecasts for one-year-ahead EPS stock price at the fiscal year-end, divided by the current stock price.
6 Additionally, Table 1 points out that the industry-wise composition of our sample of
1829 firms is strongly aligned with the S&P-composition (midway throughout our sample
period), indicating that our sample is a proper representation of the U.S. market.
7 We still perform robustness tests using the library of Henry (2008) (denoted as
Tonei q tHEN, , ) and the library of Loughran and McDonald (2011) Tone( )i q tLM, , separately, for
which we post the model validations in Table 9. The conclusions remain qualitatively
similar. The correlations between Tonei,q,t, Tonei q tHEN, , , and Tonei q tLM, , , range between 40%
and 80%. The positive correlations indicate that the different measurements capture the
underlying tone similarly.
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4.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the relevant variables. On
average FUTROAi,q,t and CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t are positive with a respective
value of 0.006 and 0.001 and a high standard deviation, indicating a
broad and diversely performing dataset. While the tone proxy following
the library of Henry (2008) Tone( )i q tHEN, , is positive, the average of the
Loughran and McDonald (2011) measure Tone( )i q tLM, , is slightly negative.
This is consistent with prior literature (see, e.g., Baginski, Demers,
Wang, & Yu, 2011; Loughran & McDonald, 2013) as the number of
negative words in the Loughran and McDonald (2011) library far ex-
ceeds the number of positive words. Our main independent variable
Tonei,q,t is obtained by averaging and scaling the sum of Tonei q tLM, , and
Tonei q tHEN, , . The variable Tonei,q,t therefore has an average of exactly zero
by construction. Panel B, in Table 3 shows the evolution of our different
tone measures throughout the years. During the financial crisis (espe-
cially in 2009) we find tone to be at its lowest point. After 2010,
Tonei q tHEN, , increases in value but does not return back to pre-crisis levels.
Tonei q tLM, , even remains negative.
Furthermore, we find that the average age (AGEi,t) is about 22 years.
The average and median of BTMi,q,t are lower than one with a high
standard deviation, implying that the dataset contains over- as well as
undervalued firms. The analysts' forecast error (FEi,q,t) is negative on
average indicating that analysts tend to overestimate earnings of firms
within the dataset. Finally, there is a strong spread in terms of opera-
tional complexity, BUSsegi,q,t and GEOsegi,q,t, indicating strong differ-
ences in firm's operating structures.
Table 4 displays the Pearson correlations of the dependent (FU-
TROAi,q,t and CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t), several proxies for Tonei,q,t, as well as
the control variables. Overall, the correlation table points out that
several of the variables used in the regressions are significantly corre-
lated with one another, making multivariate analysis an appropriate
way for investigating the posed hypotheses. The different measures of
tone are highly correlated with one another, between the ranges of 40%
and 80%. Moreover, Table 4 indicates a significant positive correlation
between tone and the independent variables, which is consistent with
prior research (see, e.g., Arslan-Ayaydin et al., 2016; Henry, 2008;
Loughran & McDonald, 2011). We also find that the tone is significantly
and positively correlated with the forecast error (FEi,q,t) and the number
of geographical and business segments (BUSsegi,q,t, GEOsegi,q,t). Ad-
ditionally, we report a negative correlation between BTMi,q,t and the
different proxies for tone, which is in accordance with the postulated
hypothesis. In terms of AGEi,t, we find a negative correlation in terms of
Tonei q tLM, , , but a positive one for the others.
5. Results of the two-step approach
Hereafter, we elaborate on the framework developed in Section 3.
Table 3
Summary statistics.
Panel A - summary statistics of the dependent variables, tone measures and controls
Mean Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3
FUTROAi,q,t 0.006 0.043 0.002 0.010 0.021
CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t 0.001 0.079 −0.037 0.0004 0.040
Tonei,q,t 0.000 0.842 −0.498 −0.058 0.425
Tonei q tHEN, , 0.034 0.032 0.012 0.027 0.046
Tonei q tLM, , −0.014 0.218 −0.127 0 0.106
AGEi,t 22.814 18.602 10 17 30
MCi,q,t (in mil.) 7.947 22.121 0.509 1.482 5.212
BTMi,q,t 0.569 0.489 0.267 0.473 0.763
FEi,q,t −0.019 0.156 −0.056 0.057 0.223
BUSsegi,q,t 5.126 5.259 1 3 9
GEOsegi,q,t 6.423 7.450 1 4 9
ROAi,q,t 0.006 0.041 0.002 0.010 0.021
RETi,q,t 0.132 0.495 −0.139 0.077 0.309
σROAi,q,t 0.015 0.028 0.003 0.006 0.014
σRETi,q,t 0.023 0.015 0.013 0.018 0.027
LOSSi,q,t 0.200 0.400 0 0 0
Δ(ROAi,q,t) −0.001 0.030 −0.005 −0.001 0.002
MedianConsi,q,t 0.008 0.028 0.006 0.013 0.018
Panel B - average tone per calendar year
Year # Observations # Firms Tonei,q,t Tonei q tHEN, , Tonei q tLM, ,
2004 1191 739 0.344 0.047 0.031
2005 3101 1058 0.306 0.043 0.043
2006 3508 1215 0.139 0.040 0.030
2007 4287 1448 0.075 0.039 0.014
2008 5115 1622 −0.155 0.032 −0.039
2009 5380 1689 −0.320 0.020 −0.073
2010 5532 1726 0.060 0.035 −0.012
2011 5341 1693 0.069 0.036 −0.014
2012 5339 1630 −0.162 0.031 −0.032
2013 5324 1589 −0.125 0.029 −0.035
2014 5068 1526 −0.099 0.031 −0.033
2015 3443 1426 −0.096 0.026 −0.045
This table reports the summary statistics of our sample. Panel A gives the descriptive statistics for the observations within the sample and Panel B shows the evolution
of the number of observations, number of firms and tone-measures over time. Note that certain variables are logarithmized in the regressions (e.g., # of business
segment, BUSseg, and Market capitalization, MC). We however present the non-transformed variable for interpretation purposes.
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This section starts by constructing the models that predict future firm
performance, and investors' reaction, through which we obtain each
firm's informativeness of tone. Furthermore, we test the normality of
the obtained sample of informativeness estimates. In the next step we
use a cross-sectional model, indicating the drivers of tone informa-
tiveness.
5.1. Differences across tone informativeness
We estimate the informativeness of tone in signaling future firm
performance for each firm separately, using a model in which we in-
clude the current profitability (ROAi,q,t, RETi,q,t, and LOSSi,q,t), operating
and business risk (σROAi q t, , and σRETi q t, , ), firm size (MCi,q,t), growth
Table 4
Correlation table.
FUTROAi,q,t CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t Tonei,q,t Tonei q tHEN, , Tonei q tLM, , AGEi,t MCi,q,t BTMi,q,t FEi,q,t
CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t 0.100***
Tonei,q,t 0.176*** 0.074***
Tonei q tHEN, , 0.172
*** 0.058*** 0.842***
Tonei q tLM, , 0.124
*** 0.067*** 0.842*** 0.418***
AGEi,t 0.138*** −0.003 0.033*** 0.098*** − 0.043***
MCi,q,t 0.103*** −0.004 0.080*** 0.135*** 0.054*** 0.258***
BTMi,q,t − 0.057*** 0.041*** − 0.178*** − 0.120*** − 0.180*** 0.037*** − 0.103***
FEi,q,t 0.079*** 0.175*** 0.104*** 0.051*** 0.123*** 0.003 0.016*** − 0.105***
BUSsegi,q,t 0.090*** 0.009* 0.089*** 0.097*** 0.053*** 0.178*** 0.094*** 0.036*** 0.031***
GEOsegi,q,t 0.108*** 0.018*** 0.080*** 0.055*** 0.079*** 0.084*** 0.087*** − 0.077*** 0.032***
ROAi,q,t 0.671*** 0.095*** 0.202*** 0.180*** 0.160*** 0.139*** 0.106*** − 0.019*** 0.173***
RETi,q,t 0.143*** − 0.051*** 0.166*** 0.145*** 0.135*** − 0.046*** 0.008 − 0.232*** 0.085***
σRETi,q,t − 0.284*** 0.003 − 0.166*** − 0.171*** − 0.109*** − 0.229*** − 0.164*** 0.169*** − 0.144***
σROAi,q,t − 0.279*** − 0.013** − 0.096*** − 0.123*** − 0.039*** − 0.157*** − 0.092*** − 0.086*** − 0.014**
LOSSi,q,t − 0.459*** − 0.098*** − 0.234*** − 0.196*** − 0.199*** − 0.166*** − 0.120*** 0.031*** − 0.205***
Δ(ROAi,q,t) 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.010* 0.008 − 0.028*** −0.003
MedianConsi,q,t 0.430*** 0.033*** 0.160*** 0.147*** 0.123*** 0.136*** 0.092*** − 0.018*** 0.170***
BUSsegi,q,t GEOsegi,q,t ROAi,q,t RETi,q,t σRETi,q,t σROAi,q,t LOSSi,q,t Δ(ROAi,q,t)
GEOsegi,q,t 0.270***
ROAi,q,t 0.095*** 0.113***
RETi,q,t 0.006 0.011* 0.128***
σRETi,q,t − 0.046*** 0.016*** − 0.296*** − 0.207***
σROAi,q,t − 0.044*** 0.004 − 0.348*** −0.002 0.271***
LOSSi,q,t − 0.086*** − 0.043*** − 0.620*** − 0.124*** 0.333*** 0.323***
Δ(ROAi,q,t) −0.003 −0.003 0.048*** 0.027*** − 0.032*** − 0.035*** − 0.083***
MedianConsi,q,t 0.118*** 0.062*** 0.519*** 0.131*** − 0.359*** − 0.275*** − 0.529*** 0.003
This table reports the Pearson correlation for the different performance measures, tone measurements and financial and accounting control variables. *, **, ***
Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on a two-tailed t-test, respectively.
Table 5
Estimation results of the firm-by-firm regressions.
Equation β0,i δi β1,i β2,i β3,i β4,i β5,i β6,i β7,i β8,i Adj R. 2
Panel A - average coefficients and significance levels in predicting future performance (FUTROAi,q,t)
Eq. (12) β − 0.013 0.158 0.114 − 0.033 0.002 0.000 − 0.021 0.072 0.004 0.0013 0.335
SEβ
0.161 1.402 0.459 0.085 1.402 0.015 0.502 0.616 0.020 0.427
+ Significant at 1% 4.98% 3.34% 8.64% 3.06% 2.24% 2.35% 1.75% 2.95% 5.3% 2.68%
+ Significant at 5% 12.36% 10.11% 16.4% 7.65% 6.23% 6.94% 6.34% 9.19% 13.12% 7.6%
+ Significant at 10% 19.03% 17.61% 21.92% 10.93% 10.93% 12.03% 11.65% 15.75% 19.03% 11.26%
− Significant at 1% 4.21% 1.26% 3.12% 3.61% 1.69% 1.59% 4.48% 1.37% 3.44% 3.44%
− Significant at 5% 11.1% 4.59% 6.89% 11.37% 6.01% 5.3% 10.22% 5.74% 9.35% 8.26%
− Significant at 10% 15.91% 8.69% 11.59% 17.82% 10.99% 9.9% 15.58% 10.88% 14% 11.86%
Panel B - average coefficients and significance levels in explaining investors' reaction (CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t)
Eq. (13) β − 0.040 1.193 0.355 0.092 0.092 0.093
SEβ
0.075 3.771 2.717 0.172 0.056
+ Significant at 1% 0.55% 3.34% 3.28% 4.76% 26.9%
+ Significant at 5% 2.52% 10.5% 9.62% 15.86% 43.79%
+ Significant at 10% 5.08% 17.44% 15.04% 25.1% 55.82%
− Significant at 1% 5.03% 0.82% 2.52% 0.71% 0.44%
− Significant at 5% 14.71% 3.88% 6.78% 3.01% 1.2%
− Significant at 10% 25.21% 7.76% 10.39% 6.07% 2.19%
This table reports the average OLS coefficient estimates and average robust standard errors, together with the frequency of significantly positive and negative
coefficients using the one-sided t-test at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, and the average adjusted R2. Results for the parameter of interest (δi) are indicated in bold.
Results are presented for predicting the future performance (Panel A) and explaining the investors' reaction (Panel B).
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(BTMi,q,t) and the forecast error (FEi,q,t):
= + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ +
i FUTROA β δ Tone β ROA
β BTM β FE β RET
β σ β σ β MC
β LOSS ε
For a given :
,
i q t i i i q t i i q t
i i q t i i q t i i q t
i ROA i RET i i q t
i i q t i q t
, , 0, , , 1, , ,
2, , , 3, , , 4, , ,
5, 6, 7, , ,
8, , , , ,
i q t i q t, , , ,
(12)
where δi in the firm-by-firm regressions represents informativeness of
Tonei,q,t in predicting FUTROAi,q,t for firm i. This approach leads to
consistent estimates of tone informativeness but has the drawback of a
relatively high estimation uncertainty because of the limited number of
available earnings press releases per firm. Nevertheless, as shown in
Subsection 3.2, these firm-by-firm OLS estimates of δi are useful, since
they can be combined into a test of homogeneity.
We run a similar regression, to estimate the regression coefficient of
tone in explaining the investors' reaction to the earnings press release,
as proxied by the CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t. In our model, we follow Arslan-
Ayaydin et al. (2016) by adding control variables for the firm's profit-
ability and growth, as well as the value of the forecast error to capture
the hard information of the earnings press release. The resulting re-
gression model is given by:
− + = + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ +
i CAR β δ Tone β ROA
β BTM β FE ε
For a given : [ 1; 1]
,
i q t i i i q t i i q t
i i q t i i q t i q t
, , 0, , , 1, , ,
2, , , 3, , , , ,
(13)
where δi represents the informativeness of Tonei,q,t in explaining CAR
[−1;+1]i,q,t for firm i.
Table 5 reports a summary of the estimation results for all 1829
firm-by-firm regressions. Panel A displays the estimation results for Eq.
(12) and Panel B reports the results for Eq. (13). We find that the
average Adj. R2 of the regressions is 33.5% (9.3%) when predicting
FUTROAi,q,t (explaining CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t). Consistent with previous
literature, the tone of earnings press releases contains information to
predict future performance and investors' reaction (Davis et al., 2012;
Henry, 2008; Loughran & McDonald, 2011), but this relationship is for
most firms not statistically significant: only around 25% of the coeffi-
cients are significant at a confidence level of 10% (17.61%+8.69% for
FUTROAi,q,t and 17.44%+7.76% for CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t). This low sig-
nificance can be explained by the limited number of available press
releases per firm. The number of earnings press releases per firm varies
between 15 and 45, with an average value of 29 observations. This also
explains why the average standard error,SEβ (1.402 and 3.771) is large
relative to the average informativeness ̂δ (0.158 and 1.193). When
pooling the information across the N=1829 firms, as shown in the
next section, the standard error is substantially reduced.8 Table 5 also
points out that the true δi is generally positive for both future perfor-
mance and earnings reaction because the percentage of significant po-
sitive δis at the one-sided test at the 10% and 5% levels are significantly
higher than the obtained significant negative δis and higher than their
respective type 1 significance levels.
Fig. 1 displays the histograms of the obtained informativeness es-
timates. We find that, a large proportion of the obtained exposure
coefficients is economically and statistically close to zero; in particular
in the case of δFUTROAi. Furthermore, both histograms display positive
skewness, with longer and heavier tails to the right, which corresponds
to the positive average coefficients of δi (0.158 and 1.193 for δFUTROAi
and − +δCAR [ 1; 1]i respectively) in Table 5. Altogether, the histograms vi-
sually deviate from normality, which is in line with our first hypothesis.
We formally evaluate the null hypothesis of homogeneity with the
normality test procedure proposed in Subsection 3.2, on the
standardized informativeness coefficients δiST . Panel A of Table 6 re-
ports the results for the Anderson-Darling, Jarque-Bera and the Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov tests. Each test controls for different criteria of nor-
mality but in all cases the null hypothesis of homogeneity is rejected.
This result is in line with H1a and H1b and complements prior litera-
ture by showing that tone indeed contains information value, but also
that there are substantial cross-sectional differences within informa-
tiveness.
5.2. Information asymmetry and tone informativeness
We now study the firm characteristics that can explain the hetero-
geneity in the tone exposure coefficients. We do this first by using a
split-sample analysis and t-tests. We then take a multivariate regression
approach.
As shown in Subsection 3.3, we, first transform our control variables
into a cross-sectional dataset. To better visualize the cross-sectional
variability of tone exposure coefficients, we report in Table 7 a split
sample of the exposure coefficients according to the information
asymmetry dimensions following our hypotheses. We define firms with
high information asymmetry as firms that belong to the bottom quartile
of smallest (MCi ), youngest (AGEi ) and most growth-oriented (BTMi )
firms, and the top quartile of firms having high forecast inaccuracy
(FE| |i ) and operational complexity (GEOsegi / BUSsegi ). Table 7 shows
no statistical difference between small and large firms in terms of
δFUTROAi, but find that the exposure coefficient is statistically larger for
young and growth-oriented firms. Additionally, we show that a larger
forecast inaccuracy, and operational complexity are associated with a
statistically larger informativeness coefficient. In terms of the investors'
reaction, we find a statistically larger coefficient for firms that are
smaller and younger, but find no statistical difference in terms of
growth-orientation. We furthermore find a statistical larger tone
Fig. 1. Histogram of the obtained tone informativeness estimates ̂δFUTROAi and̂
− +δCAR i[ 1; 1] . This figure displays the histograms of the obtained estimates of the
firm-specific tone exposure coefficients ̂δi from the separate firm-specific re-
gressions, represented in Eq. (3). The upper histogram displays the distribution
of tone informativeness in terms of predicting future firm performance
̂δ( )FUTROAi , whereas the lower histogram displays the tone informativeness in
terms of explaining the investors' reaction ̂ − +δ( )CAR i[ 1; 1] .
8 Roughly speaking, by pooling across the 1,829 firms, the standard error is shrunk by a
factor of 1/ 1,829 , as can be seen in Eq. 3 of Petersen (2009).
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exposure in terms of forecast inaccuracy and geographical complexity.
After obtaining a sample of cross-sectional values of tone informa-
tiveness (δis) and standardizing this sample, as shown in Eq. (8), we
construct a model that reveals its relationship with information asym-
metry. Again, note that we transform our dataset (Xi,q,t in Eq. (3)) to a
cross-sectional one (Zi in Eq. (9)). As posed in the second hypothesis, we
control for firm size, age and growth. We proxy for firm size by taking
the logarithm of the market capitalization, MCi . To capture the age of
the firm, we use the logarithm of the number of years since a firm first
appeared in the CRSP database: AGEi . We control for firm growth using
the logarithm of the book-to-market ratio, or BTMi . We expect MCi ,
AGEi , and BTMi to be negatively associated with tone informativeness.
The older and bigger the firm is the less asymmetric the firm is and the
less incremental information press releases contain. Similarly, as BTMi
increases, the less undervalued the firm is and the less the market is in
need for additional information to correctly assess its financial perfor-
mance.
The third hypothesis poses that the higher the absolute forecast
error (FE| |i ) is, the more uncertain stakeholders are concerning the
firm's true earnings, and the more informative tone is.9 Lastly, in
Hypotheses 4a and 4b, we test whether a firm's operational complexity
dims both the managers' view as well as the market's capacity to
evaluate future performance. The operational complexity is measured
by the logarithm of the number of business segments the firm is active
in, BUSsegi , and the amount of geographical segments, GEOsegi . We
expect the operational complexity to be positively associated with tone
informativeness.
We extend the information set of the cross-sectional regression even
further, by controlling for the profitability (ROAi , ROAΔ( )i , and LOSSi ),
the operational and business risk (σROAi and σRETi ), and the forecast
consensus (MedianConsi ). More precisely, the overall cross-sectional
model takes up the following form:
= … = + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅
+ ⋅ +
i N δ γ γ MC γ AGE γ BTM
γ FE γ BUSseg γ GEOseg
γ ROA γ RET γ σ
γ σ γ LOSS γ ROA
γ MedianCons ε


















Table 6 reports that firm size (MCi ) is negatively associated with the
information value of tone for − +δCARST [ 1; 1]i , indicating that the larger the
firm is, the less informative tone is in explaining the investors' reaction.
This result is consistent with Vermaelen (1981), in that larger firms
have a lower level of information asymmetry. We however find no
significant association between MCi and δFUTROAST i . Secondly, we report
Table 6
The cross-section of firm-by-firm estimators of the tone informativeness: het-













Panel B – regression results: drivers of the information value of tone.
(Intercept) − 2.746*** 0.568*
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ROAΔ i − 0.048 − 0.012
(0.051) (0.041)
MedianConsi − 5.710 1.022
(3.868) (2.826)
R2 0.185 0.063
Adj. R2 0.179 0.057
Num. obs. 1829 1829
F statistic 12.038 9.525
p-value 0.000 0.000
VIF 1.227 1.067
Panel A – This table reports the results of the Anderson-Darling, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov and Jarque-Bera tests in determining whether the sample of firm-
specific sensitivities (δiSTs, obtained by the firm-by-firm regressions in Eqs. (12)
and (13)) of future performance and investors' reaction to tone follow a normal
distribution. The statistic of each test is reported with the accompanying p-
value in parentheses. Panel B – This table reports the impact of information
asymmetry on the tone sensitivity as shown in Eq. (14). This cross-sectional
dataset is obtained by averaging each firm's observations over all time periods.
Obtained robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **, *** Denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on a two-tailed t-test,
respectively.
Table 7
Comparison of informativeness coefficients for firms with high and low in-
formation asymmetry.
δFUTROAi − +δCAR i[ 1; 1]
≤ Q25 ≥ Q75 t-Stat ≤ Q25 ≥ Q75 t-Stat
MCi 0.230 0.050 0.873 1.533 0.828 2.727
***
AGEi 0.420 0.016 2.191
** 1.349 0.729 3.056***
BTMi 0.292 −0.036 2.093
*** 1.163 1.133 1.048
FE| |i 0.069 0.613 − 1.981
** 1.099 1.219 − 1.689*
BUSsegi −0.025 0.292 − 2.501
** 1.234 0.811 1.164
GEOsegi −0.047 0.253 − 1.901
* 0.373 1.282 − 3.578***
This table reports a comparison of tone exposure coefficients, as estimated using
Eq. (3), for firms with high and low information asymmetry. Firms with high
(low) information asymmetry are defined as per our hypotheses, using a cross-
sectional dataset Zi in Eq. (9). More specifically, information asymmetry is
defined by the bottom (top) quartile of small (MCi ), young (AGEi ), and growth-
oriented firms (BTMi ), or the highest (lowest) quartile of firms with a high
forecast inaccuracy (FE| |i ), and the firm's operational complexity (BUSsegi /
GEOsegi ). ‘≤Q25’ (‘≥Q75’) represents the mean of the bottom (top) quartile. *,
**, *** Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on a
two-tailed t-test, respectively.
9 Since the forecast error can be positive (underestimation by analysts) or negative
(overestimation by analysts) we opt to use the average of the absolute values in order to
capture the magnitude with which analysts wrongly estimated the earnings.
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that AGEi is significantly and negatively associated with both measures
of δiST at the 1%-level. Older firms contain lower levels of information
asymmetries than younger firms (Baeyens & Manigaart, 2003), which
decreases the incremental value of tone for investors. δFUTROAST i is also
significantly and negatively affected by the firm's growth-level, BTMi .
Since the more growth-oriented the firm is, the more information
asymmetric the firm tends to be (Smith & Watts, 1992), and as such, the
more tone is informative as a signal for future performance. We thus
find evidence that firm size, age, and growth stage influence tone in-
formativeness.
We find strong evidence in favor of H3a δ( )FUTROAST i , with the coef-
ficient of FE| |i being positive and significant. Under high forecast in-
accuracy, tone is more informative in predicting future performance,
further confirming the inverse relationship between information
asymmetry and forecast inaccuracy (Atiase & Bamber, 1994;
Kimbrough, 2005). In terms of − +δCARST [ 1; 1]i , we find an insignificant
coefficient. Additionally, σRETi is significantly and positively associated
with both measures of tone informativeness. We can also conclude that
the risk environment of the firm influences the sensitivity towards the
informativeness of qualitative information.
Finally, we find that the sign of GEOsegi is positive and significant
for δFUTROAST i and − +δCAR
ST
[ 1; 1]i , however BUSsegi is only positive and sig-
nificant for the prior. Overall, these findings indicate that the tone of
earnings press releases is more informative in cases of higher opera-
tional complexity, complementing the findings of Gilson et al. (2001).
These results confirm Hypotheses 4a and 4b and show that the tone of
earnings press releases is more informative in cases of higher opera-
tional complexity.
5.3. Robustness checks
To show that our results are robust we repeat the regression of Eq.
(14) for alternative dictionary specifications. Recall that our main re-
sults are obtained using the averaged value of tone, coming from both
the positive and negative word lists of Henry (2008) and Loughran and
McDonald (2011) and that we recquire at least 15 observations per
firm. As shown in Table 8, we find that our conclusions remain robust
when using Tonei q tHEN, , and Tonei q tLM, , individually. We even find higher
significance in predicting the sensitivity of the cumulative abnormal
returns to the tone when using the Henry (2008) library. When using
Tonei q tLM, , , we fail to find support for H2a, but find strong support for H3b.
Furthermore, we test for raising the minimal number of time-series
observations per firm, and find that the cross-sectional regressions re-
main significant if we impose the requirement of having at least 20 and
25 observations per firm. We report the model validations for alter-
native dictionaries and the minimum observation length in Table 9 and
find qualitatively similar results to Table 6 which are available upon
request.
Overall, our findings from the cross-sectional analysis suggest that
information asymmetry is a key driver of tone informativeness. The
information value of tone increases as the firm is younger, smaller and
in a high-growth stage. In addition, a larger forecast error and opera-
tional complexity also drive the informativeness.
6. A panel data model with heterogeneity in tone informativeness
The results of Table 6 suggest that tone informativeness differs
across firms as a function of information asymmetry. The two-step re-
gression approach, however, is only feasible as an ex post analysis since
it requires to first estimate the exposure over a sufficiently long esti-
mation sample, and to regress those estimates on historical averages. To
study how informativeness changes in cases of high information
asymmetry, we recommend to use a panel data approach, as it allows to
directly model the cross-section and time series variation. In doing so,
the results of a panel data regression give more insight into the size of
informativeness and how it changes for different levels of information
asymmetry.
Hypotheses 2a–4b pose that informativeness is a function of firm
size, age, growth level, forecast accuracy, and operational and geo-
graphical diversification. We experimented with various functional
forms, and concluded that a parsimonious approach is to introduce
dummy variables, that control whether an observation exceeds a cer-
tain threshold value of information asymmetry. The following long-
itudinal approach estimates one panel data regression, including in-
teraction terms between tone and data-driven dummy variables:
= + ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ <
+ ⋅ ⋅ <
+ ⋅ ⋅ < + ⋅ ⋅ >
+ ⋅ ⋅ > ⋅ >
+ ⋅ +
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Table 8
Robustness – determinants of tone informativeness by library.












(Intercept) − 6.518*** 0.520 − 1.918*** 0.773***
(1.165) (0.316) (0.427) (0.297)
MCi 0.107 − 0.129
*** 0.041 − 0.128***
(0.094) (0.026) (0.033) (0.025)
AGEi − 0.525
*** − 0.234*** − 0.078 − 0.116***
(0.128) (0.044) (0.049) (0.042)
BTMi − 0.824
** − 0.207 − 0.100 − 0.391***
(0.340) (0.134) (0.146) (0.145)
FE| |i 0.311
** − 0.000 0.113* − 0.006
(0.134) (0.048) (0.058) (0.051)
BUSsegi 1.421
*** 0.070 0.345*** 0.035
(0.165) (0.046) (0.062) (0.040)
GEOsegi 0.932
*** 0.139*** 0.273*** 0.083**
(0.107) (0.037) (0.046) (0.034)
ROAi 36.548
*** 4.058** 12.360*** 2.370
(4.342) (1.605) (2.187) (1.708)
RETi 0.711 − 0.107 0.159 0.099
(0.482) (0.206) (0.245) (0.198)
σROAi 41.406
*** 2.698 8.221*** 2.719
(5.286) (2.089) (2.773) (2.442)
σRETi 39.278
** 19.191*** 16.233** 10.712*
(18.034) (6.147) (7.395) (5.672)
LOSSi 3.496
*** 0.037 0.788*** − 0.282
(0.498) (0.222) (0.253) (0.204)
ROAΔ( )i 0.021 − 0.015 0.004 − 0.018
(0.094) (0.042) (0.048) (0.044)
MedianConsi − 3.478 2.938 − 7.224
** − 0.961
(6.414) (2.653) (3.335) (2.708)
R2 0.252 0.093 0.115 0.058
Adj. R2 0.246 0.087 0.108 0.051
Num. obs. 1829 1829 1829 1829
F-statistic 15.613 13.269 8.226 8.358
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
VIF 1.337 1.103 1.129 1.061
This table reports the exposure of tone sensitivity to relevant control variables
and proxies for information asymmetry. It revisits the framework represented in
Table 7, using different dictionaries: the positive and negative wordlists of
Henry Tone( )i q tHEN, , and Loughran & McDonald Tone( )i q tLM, , This cross-sectional da-
taset is obtained by averaging each firm's available observations over all time
observations. Models are constructed using White correction for hetero-
skedasticity. Obtained robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **,
*** Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on a two-
tailed t-test, respectively.
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where εi,q,t represents the error term with zero mean, Xi,q,t represent a
set of control variables, including firm-, industry-, year- and quarter-
dummies. Y i,q,t represents either the future performance measure FU-
TROAi,q,t or the investors' reaction CAR[−1;+1]i,q,t. The dummy vari-
ables are ‘1’ if a certain condition is met and ‘0’ otherwise. Whether an
observation meets the condition depends on the benchmark values A
through F. For example, if A in <I MC Q( )i q t AMC, , is 0.1, then this dummy
is ‘1’ for observations belonging to the 10% smallest (as measured by
MCi,q,t) amongst all observations up to that point in time t.10 As such, if
condition A is met, the overall tone exposure coefficient becomes δ0 +
γ. The cut-off values A through F are not arbitrarily chosen but esti-
mated as to optimize the in-sample Adj. R2 of the panel data regression.
In doing so, Eq. (16) shows that each firm's total coefficient of Tonei,q,t
depends on the degree of its information asymmetry:
∂
∂
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Models (1) and (3) of Tables 10 and 11 compare the power of tone in
predicting future operational performance and explaining investors'
reaction with and without these dummies respectively. Using an
ANOVA-test, we find a significant statistical improvement of the Adj.R2
when controlling for information asymmetry.
These models further capture the economic significance of con-
sidering heterogeneity of tone informativeness. When predicting future
performance, the baseline model of Table 10 has an overall tone in-
formativeness coefficient of 0.888, but when taking information
asymmetry into account this value drops to 0.283. This again confirms
that the tone informativeness is lower for symmetric and transparent
firms and that the overall slope coefficient increases with the degree of
information asymmetry. For small firms (MCi,q,t), the informativeness of
tone triples when predicting future operational performance
(0.283+0.712= 0.995). We find similar increases for our other
dummy variables. The tone coefficient of younger (AGEi,t) and more
growth-oriented firms (BTMi,q,t) is larger in size. The total effect therein
even quadruples (0.283+1.026) and triples (0.283+ 0.454) respec-
tively. Consistent with our prior findings, Model (3) also reports a
significant and positive effect when the absolute value of the forecast
error (|FEi,q,t|) is high (0.283+1.067). One caveat however, concerns
the operational complexity. The dummy-variable indicates a negative
sign, which is contrary to our expectations. Models (2) and (4) in-
corporate control variables and additionally control for various fixed
effects. We find that the overall values of tone informativeness de-
creases, and even turn insignificant in terms of firm size (MCi,q,t). We
still find a statistically more significant model when controlling for
information asymmetry and find that the informativeness coefficient
remains a function of BTMi,q,t, |FEi,q,t| and AGEi,t.
Models (1) and (3) in Table 11 show that MCi,q,t, AGEi,t and |FEi,q,t|
strongly increase tone informativeness when explaining investors' re-
action. Whereas the tone of a more symmetric firm contains a coeffi-
cient of 0.477, the coefficient of a small firm, a young firm, and a firm
with highly inaccurate forecast earnings increases with 0.315, 0.247,
and 1.146 respectively. We additionally find negative and insignificant
coefficients in terms of growth stage and having a high operational
complexity. When controlling for various fixed effects and control
variables, we report that the dummies remain statistical significant. In
terms of growth stage, there is a negative and significant coefficient
accompanying BTMi,q,t, which is contrary to our expectations. Using an
ANOVA-test, Model (4) outperforms Model (2), indicating that tone
heterogeneity causes an increase in statistical performance.
Overall, the panel data results indicate that considering information
asymmetry is key in understanding how and when qualitative in-
formation matters. The signaling power of tone increases heavily when
firms are growth-oriented, younger and when forecast inaccuracy in-
creases. When explaining the investors' reaction, firm size, age (forecast
inaccuracy) strongly decrease (increase) the information value of tone.
7. Conclusion
Studying tone informativeness is of paramount importance for un-
derstanding the extent to which qualitative information can in-
crementally explain market movements, relative to quantitative in-
formation. We find that tone informativeness substantially differs
across firms and that it is driven by the firm's level of information
asymmetry.
Through an extensive empirical analysis, using sample of 52,667
earnings press releases over the period of 2004Q1 up to 2015Q4, we
show that the tone of earnings press releases is only informative for
about one quarter of the firms in our sample. We further evidence that
the tone of earnings press releases is especially informative for smaller,
younger, and growth-oriented firms. Similarly, we find an increase in
the information value of tone for firms with a higher analysts' forecast
inaccuracy and a higher operational complexity. Finally, we show that
Table 9
Robustness – validation of sensitivity to tone for alternative dictionaries and minimum observations per firm.
















15 F-statistic 12.038 9.525 15.613 13.269 8.226 8.358
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
R2 0.185 0.063 0.252 0.093 0.115 0.058
Num. obs. 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829 1829
20 F-statistic 10.624 9.646 12.342 12.374 8.760 6.857
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
R2 0.216 0.084 0.238 0.106 0.172 0.057
Num. Obs. 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476 1476
25 F-statistic 10.650 8.575 9.679 11.069 6.851 7.086
p-Value 0 0 0 0 0 0
R2 0.228 0.109 0.239 0.121 0.173 0.078
Num. obs. 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113 1113
This table reports the validation of several robustness models. Each model revisits the framework of Table 7, modelling the exposure of our sample of firm-specific
sensitivities of future performance and investors' reaction to tone, albeit using different libraries and with increasing restriction to the minimal amount of each firm's
observations (Min. obs.). For each firm we report the F-statistic, p-value, R2 and the minimal number of observations required per firm.
10 By introducing this time constraint we prevent a potential forward looking bias.
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the hypothesized drivers of tone informativeness can be directly in-
cluded into longitudinal models to predict firm performance and ex-
plain the investors' reaction. These generalized panel models show that
the slope coefficient of tone can easily double and even quadruple in
absolute size, indicating that tone is a more informative signal of future
performance when firm transparency is low. This also explains the
higher reaction of investors to the qualitative information of earnings
press releases, in such an opaque environment. These results confirm
that the marginal impact of the information contained in earnings press
releases is higher for firms with a higher level of information
asymmetry.
Whereas our primary focus in this paper lies on earnings press re-
leases, there are several other corporate disclosures available with
which firms communicate to outside stakeholders, such as CEO letters
(Boudt & Thewissen, 2018) and conference calls (Price et al., 2012). An
interesting avenue for future research would therefore be to disentangle
the tone informativeness of different types of corporate disclosures in a
comparative study, and to investigate whether the relationship estab-
lished in this paper can be extrapolated to other types of narratives.
Table 10
Signaling future performance under homogeneity and heterogeneity of the tone informativeness coefficients in panel data regressions.
FUTROAi,q,t Homogeneity Heterogeneity
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)+++ Model (4)+++
(Intercept) 0.006*** 0.015** 0.006*** 0.015**
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.006)
Tonei,q,t 0.888*** 0.161*** 0.283*** 0.090***
(0.019) (0.029) (0.000) (0.026)
⋅ <Tone I MC Q( )i q t i q t MC, , , , 0.25 0.712
*** 0.063
(0.055) (0.046)
⋅ <Tone I BTM Q( )i q t i q t BTM, , , , 0.1 1.026
*** 0.079*
(0.051) (0.041)
⋅ <Tone I AGE Q( )i q t i t AGE, , , 0.1 0.454
*** 0.097*
(0.062) (0.052)
⋅ >Tone I FE Q(| | )i q t i q t FE, , , , 0.8| | 1.067
*** 0.283***
(0.066) (0.051)
⋅ >Tone I BUSseg Q( )i q t i q t
BUSseg
, , , , 0.9
− 0.327* − 0.255*








MCi,q,t − 0.000 − 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
BTMi,q,t − 0.011*** −0.010***
(0.000) (0.000)
σROAi q t, , 0.032
*** 0.033***
(0.006) (0.006)
σRETi q t, , − 0.050
*** − 0.043***
(0.011) (0.011)
FEi,q,t − 0.000 − 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
LOSSi,q,t − 0.003*** − 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000)
Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Quarter fixed effects No Yes No Yes
R2 0.031 0.576 0.050 0.576
Adj. R2 0.031 0.560 0.049 0.561
Num. obs. 52,667 52,667 52,667 52,667
F-statistic 1674.305 37.245 457.376 37.203
p-Value 0 0 0 0
VIF 1.032 2.357 1.052 2.360
This table reports the results of panel data regressions for predicting future operational complexity FUTROAi,q,t under homogeneity (Models 1–2) and heterogeneity
(Models 3–4). The heterogeneity is controlled for by using interaction variables proxying for firms with high levels of information asymmetry. These are defined by
our hypothesis as size (MCi,q,t), age (AGEi,t), growth stage (BTMi,q,t), operational complexity (BUSsegi,q,t and GEOsegi,q,t) and earnings uncertainty (FEi,q,t). The
benchmarks for the dummy variables are obtained as those maximizing the Adj. R2. Models 2 and 4 extend Models 1 and 3, by controlling for industry-, year-,
quarter-, and firm-fixed effects. All models are constructed using White correction for heteroscedasticity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. *, **,
*** Denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level based on a two-tailed t-test, respectively. +, ++, +++ Denote the statistical significance at the
10% level with which there is a reduction in residual sum of squares between the homogeneity (Models 1–2) and heterogeneity (Models 3–4) assumption based upon
ANOVA-testing.
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Appendix A. Tone informativeness and investors' reaction
To illustrate the relationship between investors' reaction and tone, suppose that investors value the firm using the dividend discount model, such









i q t i q t
i q t i q t
, ,
, , , ,
, , , , (A.1)
where Di,q,t represents the current dividend per share, ri,q,t refers to the required rate of return and gi,q,t is the dividend growth rate. The investor uses
the available information to determine the factor that maps the value of the dividend per share into the firm value per share. Using a loglinear model
and separating the available information set into the tone of the earnings press release (Tonei,q,t) and the other relevant variables (Xi,q,t), we obtain:
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Combining Eqs. (A.1) and (A.2) gives that:
= + + ⋅ + ⋅ +V D α δ Tone β X εlog log .i q t i q t i i i q t i q t i q t, , , , , , , , , , (A.3)
We subtract the firm value of the previous time period from both sides:
− = + + ⋅ + ⋅ + −− −V V D α δ Tone β X ε Vlog log log log .i q t i q t i q t i q t i q t i q t i q t, , , 1, , , , , , , , , , 1, (A.4)
Note that the left-hand side of Eq. (A.4) expresses the return Ri,q,t. Taking the partial derivative of the conditionally expected return with respect to
tone yields δi, as in Eq. (4).
Table 11
Explaining investors' reaction under homogeneity and heterogeneity of the tone informativeness coefficients in panel data regressions.
CAR[−1,+1]i,q,t Homogeneity Heterogeneity




(Intercept) 0.001*** − 0.025 0.002*** − 0.026
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.017)
Tonei,q,t 0.700*** 0.829*** 0.477*** 0.803***
(0.041) (0.056) (0.056) (0.071)
⋅ <Tone I MC Q( )i q t i q t MC, , , , 0.33 0.315
*** 0.248**
(0.105) (0.125)
⋅ <Tone I BTM Q( )i q t i q t BTM, , , , 0.25 − 0.124 − 0.468
*
(0.097) (0.252)
⋅ <Tone I AGE Q( )i q t i t AGE, , , 0.15 0.274
** 0.493***
(0.120) (0.143)
⋅ >Tone I FE Q(| | )i q t i q t FE, , , , 0.8| | 1.146
*** 0.249*
(0.127) (0.139)
⋅ >Tone I BUSseg Q( )i q t i q t
BUSseg
, , , , 0.66
− 0.341 − 0.406










Firm fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Industry fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes
Quarter fixed effects No Yes No Yes
R2 0.006 0.087 0.008 0.088
Adj. R2 0.005 0.054 0.008 0.054
Num. obs. 52,667 52,667 52,667 52,667
F statistic 291.648 2.617 69.865 2.635
p-value 0 0 0 0
VIF 1.006 1.008 1.046 1.090
This table reports the results of panel data regressions for explaining investors' reaction CAR[−1; +1]i,q,t under homogeneity (Models 1–2) and heterogeneity
(Models 3–4). The heterogeneity is controlled for by using interaction variables proxying for firms with high levels of information asymmetry. These are defined by
our hypothesis as size (MCi,q,t), age (AGEi,t), growth stage (BTMi,q,t), operational complexity (BUSsegi,q,t and GEOsegi,q,t) and earnings uncertainty (FEi,q,t). The
benchmarks for the dummy variables are obtained as those maximizing the Adj. R2. Models 2 and 4 extend Models 1 and 3, by controlling for industry-, year-,
quarter-, and firm-fixed effects. All Models are constructed using White correction for heteroscedasticity. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis.
K. Boudt et al. International Review of Financial Analysis 57 (2018) 231–245
243
Appendix B. Simulation study of finite sample properties of the proposed test for heterogeneity
We use a simulation analysis to verify the statistical validity of the proposed test for heterogeneity for various values of N and T. The observations
are simulated as follows. First we draw a hypothetical independent tone variable Tonei,t from the uniform distribution between − 1 and 1. Then we
draw an idiosyncratic error term ui,t from the normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation of 0.5. We then compute the performance
measure as follows:
= + ⋅ +Y α δ Tone u ,i t i i i t i t, , , (B.1)
where Y i,t represents the dependent variable (i.e. ROA or CAR[−1;+1]) and the intercept, αi, is fixed at 0.5. Under the assumption of homogeneity,
all firms have the same δ fixed at 1. Under the setup of heterogeneity, we assume that half of the firms take a δi of 0.1 and the other half a δi of 1.
Next, we run firm by firm regressions and obtain the sample of N estimated ̂δ s, and standardize following Eq. (8). We then test for the sample
normality using the Anderson-Darling test (with a confidence level of 95%).11 We repeat this process 1000 times and count the number of times
normality is rejected. Results are reported in Table 12. We show that, with increasing N and T, the rejection rate of normality tends to 100% in the
heterogeneous case, and approximates the 5% nominal size level in case of homogeneity. We indicate in bold the situation that is most representative
for our sample, where we have N=1,829 firm entities and on average about T=29 observations per firm, and we find that there is consistent
rejection of normality in the heterogeneous case.
Table 12
Rejection rate of normality under heterogeneity and homogeneity.
Heterogeneity Homogeneity
T
N 20 25 29 50 20 25 29 50
10 0.078 0.102 0.108 0.270 0.040 0.064 0.048 0.052
50 0.242 0.540 0.670 0.972 0.060 0.060 0.062 0.050
100 0.550 0.764 0.910 1.000 0.064 0.076 0.046 0.058
500 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.064 0.070 0.052 0.048
1000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.068 0.066 0.054 0.051
1829 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.072 0.064 0.054 0.047
2000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.078 0.064 0.055 0.048
This table reports the overall rejection rate of the obtained test of homogeneity, following a simulated relationship between a dependent variable Y i,t and an
independent variable Tonei,t, under both a heterogeneous and homogeneous relationship. The bold situation indicates similar dimensions to our data sample.
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